The objective of the study is to introduce late modern age legal opinions on custom and its place among sources of law in the Hungarian legal system. It focuses especially on the characteristics and functions of custom and clarifies the relationship between custom and the law as such (lex, act) as another source of law. The Hungarian modern age is characterised by a symbiosis between custom and the law and by a related dispute about how they relate to eachother. The authors of the study focused their attention on a dispute over the derogatory function of custom in relation to the law and highlighted the trend of a major effort towards codification and the related growing importance of lex as a source of law. At the same time custom was losing its "folk character" and gradually gained a forensic form (custom formally included as a basis for court decisions). In Hungarian legal history, custom held an irreplaceable position among sources of law in the legal system, and modern age jurisprudence scholars attempted to develop or reformulate the theoretical principles enshrined in the Opus Tripartitum (1514) (J. Szegedi, S. Huszty, E. Kelemen, A. Kövy, P. Szlemenics, I. Frank, etc.).
Introduction
At the end of the 15 th century codification attempts were strengthened in Hungary and were achieved in three ways; firstly, by collecting and systemising Hungarian laws with a goal of creating a comprehensive collection of law (collectio decretorum), 1 secondly, by collecting and transcribing customary law -mainly the law of the nobility (Tripartitum), and thirdly, by collecting court decisions.
2 The most significant attempt to write down and systemise the unwritten Hungarian unwritten customary law was the publication produced by the protonotary of the Hungarian Supreme Court 3 (the Curia Regia) called Stephen Werbőczy 4 at the beginning of the 16 th century (1514). His work was called
The Opus Tripartitum as an Original Source of Law as well as a Source of Knowledge...

Opus Tripartitum iuris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae partiumque adnexarum (Eng. The Customary Law of the Renowned Kingdom of Hungary in Three Parts
, hence, the Tripartitum). Werbőczy was charged with recording valid customary law of the nobility pursuant to laws no. 6 of 1498 and no. 10 of 1500. It took several years to complete this publication, as the existent customary law was extensive and the task difficult because Werbőczy also took court practice, laws, royal regulations, privileges and statutes into consideration. The publication was completed in 1514, consequently submitted for review by the special committee and on November, 19 th , 1514 informally sanctioned by the King. However, the king did not grant the Tripartitum the royal seal, so it did not enjoy official sanction, and hence was not in accordance with constitutional law. The reasons for the king's decision continue to be disputed to the present day. The most probable reason is that the upper class nobility was opposed to the una et eadem nobilitas principle (equality of all noblemen). However, the Tripartitum notetheless gained validity through customary law. It was first printed in Vienna in 1517, and from 1628 became an inseparable part of the Hungarian law collection called Corpus Iuris Hungarici. 5 The structure 6 of Tripartitum is as follows; the dedication (comendatio) in which the author recommended the publication to the King; the royal approbation (approbatio); the introduction (prologus), which is divided into 16 chapters (articles) and contains contemplation which are more theoretical than normative about the concepts of law, justice, legislation, custom, and the rendering of judgements; the first part (prima pars) consisting of 134 chapters about the private law of the Hungarian nobility, specifically the donation law, the law of obligations, ius in re, the law of succession, etc.; the second part (pars secunda) divided into 86 chapters containing the provisions about remedial law and the sources of law; the third part (pars tertia), which is divided into 36 chapters and contains particular laws such as city law, vassal law, Croatian law, and Transylvanian law; the conclusion (operis conclusio), which is comprised of the author´s notes regarding terminology and the language used; the conclusion of the royal approval decree, and the greeting to readers (salutatio) written by Werbőczy, subsequently, after the imperfect royal sanctioning, and describing the relevant reasons and the necessity for issuing the publication in a written form. Among the idea sources to the Tripartitum, important for theoretical contemplations about custom as a source of law, was, according to Martyn Rady, the Summa Legum of Raymundus Parthenopeus, published in Cracow in 1506. Other portions were taken from Gratian, the Digest and Institutes, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Italian civilian texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, most notably those of Accursius and Bartolus. 7 Werbőczy was also inspired also by rhetorical and predicatory publications, e.g. by Pelbart of Timișoara (1435-1504). Generally, it can be stated that the Tripartitum is the fundamental publication of Hungarian medieval law. Even though it did not become lex, it was widely used and generally recognised as a source of law in court practice, legislation (the Tripartitum was called the Decretum generale), jurisprudence, and literature. The change it brought into the legal life of the Kingdom of Hungary was profounf as what had previously been unwritten customary law was transformed into written customary law. A short time after the publication of the Tripartitum demands for revision of the publication occurred, pointing out discrimination against the upper class nobility in favour of the middle and lower class nobility. The revision attempts, known as Quadripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii regni Hungariae and subsequently also as Novum Tripartitum, were not sanctioned and did not affect the exclusivity and importance of the Tripartitum for the Hungarian legal order in the modern age.
In this study we will take a closer look at the introduction of the Tripartitum (prologus) and the theoretical principles enshrined within it, about custom, its functions, and its place in both the Hungarian legal system and in daily life in Hungarian society.
Theoretical Principles Governing Custom Enshrined in the Tripartitum
The first scientific approach to custom as a source of Hungarian medieval law can be found in the introduction of the Tripartitum (prologus), where Werbőczy, inspired by Bartol de Saxoferrato, 9 formulated the first definition of custom, even though it was an imperfect one from a contemporary point of view. According to Werbőczy, custom was the fundamental source of Hungarian law. Under chapter 10 (1) of the Tripartitum's prologue:
Custom may (for our purpose) be defined thus: it is that certain ius, introduced through the practices of whosoever can by public authority enact laws. Therefore, custom also falls within the name of ius, and if a prince orders that one should judge according to ius, then a judge can pass judgment according to custom and the statutes of the place. Contrariwise: a common law falls within the name of custom. Thus, if someone makes mention of custom in his plaint, then a common law may be seen as meant.
10
The historical primacy of the definition of Hungarian custom can be found in chapter 10 of the Tripartitum's prologue. Under this provision:
Custom is a certain law, arising from practise, taken for law where law is deficient. it agrees with religion, comports with order, and serves salvation. It is called custom, for it is, as it were, common practice and human use because it is in common use.
12
The Tripartitum subsequently established the characteristics of custom thus: 1) rationality (ratio); 2) prescription (praescriptio); 3) repetition of actions (frequentia actuum). Ad 1. Rationality was for a long time perceived as the elementary, inner attribute of custom, and modern age jurisprudence accepted and stemmed exclusively from Werbőczy's theory (Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (3)): "It must be reasonable. It is reasonable when it aims and advances the goal of law.
[…] According to civil law, a custom is reasonable if it aims at the common weal".
13
Ad 2. Prescription (praescriptio) was the characteristic, which Werbőczy took from canon law and made into an outer characteristics of custom. Except when accepting a custom as being created tacitly, out of silence (Tripartitum, prologus, chapters 10 and 11), 14 Werbőczy required that the custom endure for a certain time 15 as any new custom had to be introduced into life slowly, over a certain period of time, and not instantly (Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11 (2)).
16
Ad 3. Repetition of actions -not only did the Tripartitum broadly define the repetition of behaviour, there was actually even some controversy apparent:
Repetition of the act is needed (requiritur frequentia actuum). Say, however, that a repeated act is not in itself necessary for the establishment of a custom. But because the consent of the people cannot be deduced from one single act, the repetition of the act can be seen as the cause and custom as the effect. And it is necessary to have so many and such well known acts that it becomes in all likelihood known to most of the people, for it is not the act but the tacit consent of the people that established custom. Thus, when the tacit consent of the people can be deduced, then the great 12 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (1). J.M. Bak, P. Banyó, M. Rady (eds. and trans.), Stephen Werbőczy: The Customary Law..., pp. 31-33.
13 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (3). Ibidem, p. 33. 14 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11: "And the law differs from the custom in three ways. First: as tacit and express (tacitum et expressum)." Ibidem, p. 35. Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (7): "And it is necessary to have so many and such well known acts that it becomes in all likelihood known to most of the people, for it is not the act but the tacit consent of the people that establishes custom." Ibidem, pp. 33-35. 15 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (5): "Secondly, custom must be prescriptive, i.e., it must last for an appropriate time and must receive force in the course of that time required for prescription. But this holds only for cannon law and is not required even by that law unless it contradicts positive law. According to civil law, a decade, that is the passage of ten years, is sufficient for the introduction of a custom, even if it contradicts civil law. If, however, a custom contradicts canon law, then the space of forty years is required. Yet, if a custom is introduced in the absence of law, then, even in respect of cannon law, a decade seems to be sufficient. The passage of ten years begins from the time the first act is performed by the people." Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (6): "What I have said concerning civil law, that ten years is sufficient overall, is limited to cases where custom is invoked in matters that are not reserved to the prince as the mark of his supreme power. For then a custom cannot be introduced except after so long a time that no one can recall when the custom started."Ibidem, p. 33. 16 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11 (2): "Third: as momentary and continual; because custom cannot be introduced in an instant. What is tacit, progresses at a slower pace than what is expressly stated. Nor is that, which emerges from inference as certain as that which is expressed. Therefore, custom cannot be introduced by the people at once, but only gradually (ideo consuetudo proprie non potest statim induci per populum sed successive)". Ibidem, p. 35. recurrence of acts is important. What is more, a custom can occasionally be introduced by a single act (ex uno actu) with a repeated cause lasting for as long as it takes to establish a custom […] .
17
The relation consuetudo versus lex was also expressed also in the effects (functions) of a custom among which were the explanatory function, thevsubstitutive function, and the derogatory function. The explanatory function enabled the custom to explain a disputable provision of the law.
18 According to the derogatory/abrogatory function, if the custom was in conflict with the law created earlier, such a law was derogated or abrogated by the custom. 19 In the modern age, polemics were held about such a wide derogatory and abrogatory function of custom, and experts advocated either for or against it. In the modern age, there was a fundamental change as this wide derogatory and abrogatory function of custom was narrowed. As we will highlight later, local custom could not derogate a law that was valid in the whole Kingdom. Related to the derogatory function, the Tripartitum (prologus, chapter 12) differentiated between two types of custom -general custom and local custom:
If a law precedes a contrary custom that followed later, then the custom, if it is general, overrules the law in general and totally. If a custom is only local, it does not overrule a law in general, but only in that place where the custom is in force. If, however, a custom precedes a contrary law that came after it, then the custom does not overrule the law, in fact, the later law abolishes that custom.
20
The substitutive function of custom 21 was important for filling in gaps in the legal order; mainly as the per analogiam view was extensively accepted in law in those times. These chapters of Tripartitum were the theoretical foundation for the regulation of custom in the Kingdom of Hungary which was inspired by middle age theoretical knowledge and was at the centre of attention of modern age jurisprudence polemics. Interestingly enough, custom, as redefined in the modern age, survived until the 19 th century.
22
17 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 10 (7). Ibidem, pp. 33-35.
18 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11 (3): "Custom has threefold value. Namely, explanatory, as it is the best interpreter of the law, so when law is doubtful, we have to refer to the custom of the place, and if it is clear from that there is no need to deviate from the meaning given by custom." Ibidem, p. 35.
19 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11 (4): "Secondly it has abrogatory value, because it supersedes law when it contradicts custom." Ibidem.
20 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 12. Ibidem. 21 Tripartitum, prologus, chapter 11 (5): "Thirdly, it has substitutive value, because it replaces law where this is deficient." Ibidem.
22 "However, the Middle Ages lasted longer in some parts of Europe than in others, in Hungary it lasted well until the nineteenth century, in sharp contrast to Austria, where customary law had faded away. Consuetudo regni, as a legal source, possessed greater vitality than royal decree, a decretum enacted by the King with the consent of the Estates, royal privilege, or the judgment of the law court." L. Pétér 
The Development of Werbőczy's Teachings on Custom in Hungarian Jurisprudence Publications of the Modern Age
Hungarian jurisprudence of the modern age stemmed from Werbőczy's teaching, even though it has been revised and disputed since the 16 th century. Jurisprudence scholars optimised their opinions and statements according to the modern age reality of the day, where custom was gradually granted a weaker position within the system of formal sources of law, in favour of the stronger lex.
When (1847), and member of the historical school of jurists. From 1819 he was a Professor at the Law Academy in Košice (Kassa), where he taught criminal and private law. During 1827-1850 he worked as a professor at the Pest University, where he taught private law (before him E. Kelemen taught there). His work about public law theoretical questions and topics these Hungarian jurists (called iuris consulti in those times) diverged from or even rejected". Werbőczy´s teachings. On the other hand, they simultaneously maintained, and de facto preserved, fundamental legal-theoretical teaching on custom. Differently said, late modern age Hungarian jurisprudence was based mainly on Werbőczy's teaching on custom as a primary source of law in the modern age Kingdom of Hungary and also in the pre-codification modern era. The principal change came in the second half of the 19 th century, as law became codified (an exception was the civil substantive law which remained uncodified).
Definition of Custom and Its Place Among other Sources of Law in the Legal System
When scholars of the jurisprudence of the Hungarian late modern age jurisprudence attempted to redefine what they meant by custom, they reaffirmed Werbőczy´s characteristics (rationality, prescription, repetition of actions), because they strongly cherished historical legal tradition and wanted to preserve the theoretical basics. It is appropriate herein to cite the jurisprudence scholar Huszty: "Custom can be defined as unwritten law, used in the people´s traditions, as the law must be created by the public authority, and for the creation of custom the legislator´s assent is enough (citing Tripartitum, introduction, chapter 10)." 30 The privileged states (representing the Hungarian people, in the sense of the Werbőczy defined populus), delegated in the Hungarian assembly (together with the King) were regarded as legislators. These were the characteristics of custom, more or less generalised in modern age jurisprudence, according to Huszty: 1) universality; 2) independence from other sources of law (specifice sumitur), mainly differentiation from the law;
3) mainly unwritten character; 4) permanency and stable frequency; 5) legitimacy granted by the legislature (represented by privileged groups of people).
31
The essential theoretical and practical problem was custom's position in the legal order and its relation to other sources of law, primarily to the law itself (lex versus con-(A közigazság törvénye) was one of the first university textbooks issued in the Hungarian language. Another famous publication of Frank's was Principia iuris civilis Hungarici (1829) suetudo). The key approach was the distinction between general 32 custom and local custom.
33 Already Werbőczy had already made such a distinction, which played an important role in attempts to limit the derogatory power of custom. Kelemen, who inspired a whole generation of jurists, stated about the types of customs, that except for "the general and particular custom -one flourishing in the whole Kingdom and one only in its part, its district, its city or in a smaller society,ˮ there also existed "court custom (judicialis, named also as stilus curiae) and out-of-court custom (extraiudicialis), depending on whether it was created/strengthened by the court decision."
34 Kelemen stated about court custom that it was created or strengthened by court practice.
A less disputed question in the modern age was the form that the custom would take. The statement that any recognized custom belonged to ius non scriptum was no longer true, as customary law was written up in the Tripartitum. Werbőczy himself (prologus, chapter 11 (1)) answered the question about what distinguished custom from law: "As written and unwritten, though, this is not an essential difference."
35 Such a question was irrelevant, as Frank, 36 and others before him others, accepted custom in both a written and unwritten form, and as custom gained written form for a certain time after the publication of the Tripartitum, but, at the same time, was not deprived of the possibility of further development, and so new, even unwritten customs could come into existence. In the court practice in the Kingdom of Hungary in the modern age the application of the Tripartitum, as a form of written custom, for a certain (relatively long) time stabilised legal relations and the courts referred to it as to the decretum generale. In late modern age jurisprudence, custom was formally granted an equal position with the law, however the commentaries (tractates) unambiguously placed custom after the law, as a secondary source of law. It is therefore evident, that in subsequent modern age development, custom lost its supremacy among the sources of law in the legal system, specifically its supremacy over the law -theoretically created by Werbőczy. 37 Kövy already awarded custom a secondary position expressis verbis among Hungarian sources of law (secundum principium) and, at the same time, stressed its subsequent, successive creation (successive introducantur), accepted either by explicit or presumed consent of the lawmaker. 38 At the same time, both János Jung and Ignác Frank 39 stated: "The major part of the civil law employed by the masses, comes from custom, not only orally handed down, but also introduced by the customary law to these masses." So, taking into account the amount of regulated legal relations, custom continued to have the factual supremacy in 32 "If somebody refers to custom in their action in court, they refer to general law.ˮ J. Szegedi custom born." 45 The modern age jurists were again aware of the problem of proving the repetition of actions, important for the creation of any custom, and so Huszty and Kelemen added that "the clever judge has to decide."
46 They referred to an already formulated thesis about the impossibility of proving a first action and the repetition of actions. Furthermore, Szlemenics confirmed that for custom to gain the power of the law, it had to be binding (literally it had to "have the will to be binding"), because he realised that "there are different repetitious actions of the masses which are only habits but not customs." 47
Value (Functions or Effects) of Custom
Werbőczy briefly characterised what the functions of custom were in chapter 11 of the Tripartitum, while Hungarian scholars fought bitter battles over the concepts. Neither the substitutive nor the explanatory functions of custom in relation to the law were problematic. The real theoretical and practical problems were bound with custom's derogatory function, as late modern age jurisprudence engaged in controversy with the original opinion of Werbőczy and even resisted it. It can be concluded that the results of polemics of the Hungarian jurists distorted the crucial position of custom and opened the way for a different hierarchisation of the sources of law in the Hungarian legal order. It was already Kitonich who criticised mainly the derogatory effect of custom on the law. 48 Late modern age science chose a restrictive approach towards custom's having any broad derogatory function, and settled on the theory that only general custom was equal to law (had equal legal force). However, this was not generally accepted, and e.g. Szegedi, Huszty, and Kelemen advocated Werbőczy's theory about custom's derogatory function. Szegedi stated that: "However, Kitonich, even though innocently, challenged this statement when in chapter 1, question 9 [he] stated: «If we allow custom to be a full-valued law, then it can as well derogate it.»" 49 The fight about custom's derogatory function was at the same time a fight for modernisation on one hand and for Hungarian traditionalism on the other. The ideological background of this fight was the debate between the historical school of jurists (in the Kingdom of Hungary represented by Gusztáv Wenzel and Béni Grosschmid) and the natural school of jurists. This debate fundamentally stigmatised the Hungarian legal system and endured until the time of the creation of modern law.
